

Counterintelligence Quarterly

Aug 2005

Issue 9



Leadership Message

*From the desk of
Deputy Director, OCI
JOHN E. SWIFT*

Good day to all!

It is my privilege to take these few moments to formally introduce myself to you as the new Deputy Director of the Office of Counterintelligence and to thank each of you who have so generously, over the past weeks, sought me out to offer kind introductions and assistance as I move into this most exciting—and challenging counterintelligence (CI) position. For those of you whom I have not yet met, I hope to visit you soon to share thoughts as I seek to better understand our CI mission and your personal and professional goals.

What can I tell you about myself? I'm a family person who likes to spend time with my family as they grow and begin families of their own. I like to come to work and like to work with people who also enjoy coming to work.

Since the start of high school I've

lived in and around the Nation's Capital and called it home—that is, at least as much as a near-thirty year career in Army CI would allow anyone to call any one place home. I've spent virtually my entire professional life in CI and I believe in the importance of the CI mission. CI is people-focused, often gritty, seldom loved, but by any measure my life's experience has provided, it's an essential mission. The Department, a unique collection of laboratories and sensitive sites, serves as the repository of the nation's most sensitive information and research. As such, we are confronted by foreign collection and international terrorist threats compounded in their intensity by the reality of the compromised insider and the unrelenting probing of today's cyber collectors. I believe it a true observation that the CI mission of the Department of Energy is the most complex CI mission in the federal government.

My professional life has been spent building teams. I find it important to find common ground, seek consensus, and develop a sense of shared ownership over the task at hand. I don't appreciate stovepipes and turf-consciousness, so you should not be surprised if I ask you to share a good concept you've developed with someone else, or ask you to also seek counsel on your question with another. Sharing information is better than not.

To my CI Team: I believe in training—for everyone! So I was excited to see individual and corporate training plans in place. You can expect me to encourage each of us—both federal and contract employees—to identify quality training opportunities and then set aside the means and time to attend. Inaction and bureaucratic inertia challenge me. I've found, though, that constant, applied, gentle pressure on the question at hand is at times more effective than the "bull in a china shop" approach.

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Suspicious Behavior, Close to Home

By Deirdre Criss—Pantex

It all began at the McCarran Airport in Las Vegas, NV. My husband and I were returning from a long-awaited vacation. While standing at the gate waiting to board, we noticed a man who looked, well – odd. Why was he odd? Because he was wearing a leather coat - it was about 110 degrees outside and he appeared to be Middle Eastern. The rest of his clothing wasn't in keeping with the coat, he was wearing sandals, and his carry-on bag appeared to have two strange looking items that looked to be canisters of some sort. Most passengers waiting on the plane were sitting, reading a book or talking with other passengers, but this guy appeared to just *observe* everything. He watched the actions of the gate crew. He watched the actions of the waiting crowd... he watched everything.

I pointed him out to my husband, and asked if it appeared unusual to him. He agreed that wearing a coat in the middle of summer in Las Vegas was strange, but both of us were hesitant to say anything to the woman behind the desk. After all, we didn't want to be accused of "profiling"! So, we did nothing. We boarded the flight, and the man that we had noticed seated himself in the middle of the plane. He appeared to be traveling by himself. Shortly after we got seated, another man of Middle-Eastern descent boarded the plane, and was seated up front. While placing a briefcase in the overhead bin, he visually searched out the man we had been watching, and exchanged a brief glance that seemed to be of some significance to both. My uneasy feelings began to resurface as my husband leaned over to ask if I had noticed "the look". Meanwhile, a *third* man appeared, he also seemed to be of Middle-Eastern descent, and made his way directly to the back of the plane even though there were plenty of empty seats towards

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the front. This man had no carry-on bags and made no eye contact with anyone. He seated himself one row behind us, across the aisle.

My husband and I, now jittery with nerves, began debating if we should notify someone. I mean, exactly WHAT were we nervous about? That they were Middle-Eastern? That they were by themselves, yet two of them looked at each other? That one of them was wearing a coat? What?! We didn't want to appear as if we were singling them out because of their appearance. This was after the 9/11 attacks, and the news was full of reports of Middle-Eastern people being harassed or unjustly accused of wrong-doing, just because of their appearance. So again, we did nothing – except to sit nervously in our seats, wondering if something was up. I buried myself in a book and tried to calm my nerves, but my husband was constantly updating me on the actions of the man in the middle of the plane. “He just keeps looking around!” whispered my husband. “Everyone else is reading or sleeping, but he’s watching everything like a hawk!” I glanced up, and it DID seem as if he was overly observant. I just shut my eyes and tried to sleep. Nothing we could do now. We were already airborne.

Thankfully – the flight, which seemed endless, touched down at Amarillo International. I told my husband that we were just being nervous. It was our first time to fly since the attacks and we just got ourselves worked up over nothing. Our panicky feelings disappeared once we arrived safely.

The captain turned off the seatbelt sign, and the man we had been watching in the middle of the plane immediately jumped up. He turned, sought out the man at the back, and exchanged a long, meaningful look with him. The man in the back – whom we had not been watching, then reached down to his waist, and flipped a switch on what appeared to be a timing device that was clipped to his belt. I was eye-level with his waist and noticed that the numbers appeared to reflect the time spent in the air. He glanced at me, and saw that I had noticed his timer.

My husband and I had had enough. He turned to me and flatly stated, “That’s it. I’m telling security.” We deplaned and headed straight for the first TSA person that we saw. As we were relaying the experience, the men, who were now walking together, left the secure area. I pointed to them and said “There they go now!” and watched as they headed down the escalator to the baggage claim area. The guard called security and had them go down after them. He radioed back up that the three men were no longer together. The men that had sat at the front and the back were gone, and they couldn’t locate the man that had originally caught our interest. As this report was being relayed over the radio, the man in question wandered back up to the security gates. I told the guard that he was back and he said he was watching him.

At this point, it got strange. The man attempted to go back to the gate without going through the metal detectors. The guard stopped him and told him to go through security. He said OK and went and stood in line. When he got up to the first TSA person, she asked him for his boarding pass and he stated he didn’t have one. She told him he couldn’t go to the gates without a pass. So he left. He went to the ticket agent and bought a one-way ticket to Dallas. By this time, airport security was reporting his actions over the radio so we could hear what was going on, even though we were still at the security gates. The ticket agent reported that she asked him if he had any luggage to check, but he had said that his bags were already checked through to Dallas. (side note – How could he have checked his bags to Dallas? He didn’t have a ticket!) He made his way back to security and again attempted to go through. This time, he was subjected to a thorough search. His carry-on bags were opened and unpacked. The strange items that my husband and I had first observed in McCarran turned out to be two rolled mats. The other contents were just the normal, everyday items that a person would normally stow in a carry-on bag. After his bags were checked, airport security brought him away from the security gate, and spoke with him in a private room. I do not know what they

asked him, but I do know that he missed his flight. The guard that we had reported to, informed us after they had released him, that he had appeared “more nervous than a person should normally be in the same situation.” I left my contact information with him, and we finally left the airport.

Looking back on this experience, I strongly believe that I witnessed a “dry run”. In the world of Counterintelligence, a dry run is defined as behavior that appears to be preparation for a terrorist act, such as mapping out routes, playing out scenarios with other people, monitoring key facilities/events, timing traffic lights or traffic flow, or other such suspicious activities. Taken independently, the actions of the men we observed that day would not seem to be suspicious. However, when we put together all of the things that they had been doing, it gave the appearance of an unusual situation.

We questioned ourselves a lot that day. We were worried that we would be accused of discrimination and profiling, when in fact all we were was concerned. What if that had been an actual hijacking about to take place? When should I have reported the behavior we were witnessing? If I am mistaken about the intentions of these men, then I wish there was some way that I could apologize to them for the inconvenience we had put upon them, but I am not sorry we reported their behavior. We all need to be a bit more observant of our surroundings in this day and age. The lesson that I have taken from this is to **not be afraid to report a suspicious incident to the nearest law enforcement/security professional as soon as possible.**



Counterintelligence News Items

By Gary Chidester—HQ

“Man Indicted in Spy Probe”

A West Virginia man accused of illegally possessing secret US government documents was indicted on June 21, 2005, by a federal grand jury in Elkins, WV. The one-count indictment alleges that Lawrence Anthony Franklin, 58, willfully retained classified documents at his West Virginia home. A search of the home last June turned up 83 such documents from the Pentagon, where Franklin works as an analyst. The FBI contends that Franklin, who has been a member of the Department of Defense since 1979, was authorized to carry documents in Maryland, Virginia and Washington, D.C., but not in West Virginia. If convicted, Franklin faces up to 10 years in prison and a fine of up to \$250,000. He has also been indicted in federal court in Alexandria, VA, on six charges that he leaked classified military information to employees of a pro-Israel lobbying organization and an Israeli official. Franklin has pleaded not guilty to those charges and faces trial September 6, 2005.

“Economic Espionage Directed at Energy Firms”

A FBI security awareness forum hosted in June by the West Texas Energy Technology Initiative identified that information, technology and other trade secrets held by West Texas energy firms are prime targets for economic espionage. The FBI agents identified the oil and gas industry as a prime economic espionage target by stating “The percentage of oil that we have gotten out of the ground here is the envy of the world” and “If some foreign countries could get a similar percentage of oil from secondary and tertiary recovery methods, it would revolutionize their economies.” The FBI identified tactics employed by foreign governments and companies to access

trade secrets and sensitive information from US firms to include solicitation via phone or e-mail, positioning informants inside companies as long-term employees and surreptitiously gaining information when U.S. employees travel abroad. The FBI stressed that the need for intelligence information has not gone away since the end of the Cold War and indicated that it is the same people attempting to collect the same information however; it is now directed at other things, like the oil and gas industry.

Office of Counterintelligence



Chicago Office of Counterintelligence Supports "Take Your Children to Work Day"

The annual "Take Your Children to Work Day" for DOE Federal and contractor employees and their families was held on April 28, 2005. It was sponsored by the Office of Science and hosted by the Chicago Site Office. Marvin Gunn, the Chicago Office Manager greeted approximately 140 children between the ages of 8-12 along with their parents. Again this year, the Office of Counterintelligence participated in this well attended event providing information regarding the counterintelligence program and manning a counterintelligence display (as seen in the above picture) which attracted many of the attending DOE and contractor visitors and their children. Chicago Office counterintelligence (CI) officials, including the CI Office Manager, were on hand to respond to various questions about the local counterintelligence program. Handouts were distributed with additional information.

The entire event was deemed a success by Chicago Office Management and plans for next year's event are already under way.

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Awareness Program Gizmos and Gadgets

By Deanna Austin—HQ



Jump drives, pen drives, USB flash drives, -- not new but may need to be viewed in a new light. These gadgets are lightweight, small, portable and capable of storing a large amount of information. Through plug and play technology, users simply plug into a USB port and copy or drag and drop files, presentations, spreadsheets or an entire folder of information. If done on an unattended computer, chances are the individual would not even be aware that the contents on his/her hard drive have been copied.

The technology that allowed users to carry information for quick access in other computers continues to evolve and improve.

USB flash drives have different designs, different capacity and different prices. Some now carry functions such as an MP3 player and digital voice recorder. DOE/NNSA personnel need to be aware of the capabilities that could lead to potential abuse of this technology including removal of unclassified, proprietary, or classified material or clandestinely recording meetings. It is even possible to delete files without connecting the drive to a computer.

- ◆ USB flash drives can go as high as 4GB of memory
- ◆ USB flash drives can store personal information without saving to a computer hard drive
- ◆ USB flash drives can last more than 10 years

- ◆ Digital voice recorder could capture 10 or more hours
- ◆ USB flash drives are small and discreet

Our labs, plants, and other sites are making significant technology contributions to National and Homeland Security. Through awareness of possible collection methods, DOE/NNSA personnel can recognize situations that should be reported to their local Counterintelligence Office.



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I am impressed—an understatement, truly—with the maturity and experience of our counterintelligence team. I am equally aware of the unique challenges that may be posed to you—and me—by a culture that wants to share thoughts and research openly and that may not be married wholly to the idea of aggressively protecting our sensitive information. That culture, however, renders CI maturity, in my view, all the more necessary. And its' absence all the more telling.

What can you expect from me? Honest and forthright attention to your problems and issues. My best effort to obtain the resources you need to do the job. I will tend to the day-to-day operations of the counterintelligence program as require attention at the departmental level. In this regard, you will find me relying upon the chain of command to transmit information upwards, downwards, and laterally. I shall oversee our budgets and our resource allocation, including timely hiring and assignment of personnel.

I will frequently represent the Secretary's viewpoint in the Intelligence Community. I will do my best to insure that your issues are addressed and ask, in turn, your attention and responsiveness to the issues and questions that are addressed to you. My method is simple: my door is always open and no phone call or email shall go unanswered. I hope that you use me to facilitate actions and issues that seem intractable or in need of a new set of eyes. I try to listen and, to the best of my ability, I will act upon what you tell me.

I am thrilled to have this opportunity and at the prospect of meeting and working with each of you. Thanks for all that you are doing!

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS AND READER FEEDBACK WELCOME

Counterintelligence Quarterly:
Reporting on the nexus between quality
science, technology and
counterintelligence

Published by:

U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Counterintelligence and
Office of Defense Nuclear
Counterintelligence
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Washington, DC 20585

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